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Abstract 
Weapons related webpages from nine cryptomarkets were manually duplicated in February 2016. Information about the listings (i.e. sales 
proposals) and vendors’ proﬁles were extracted to draw an overview of the actual online trafﬁcking of weapons. Relationships between 
vendors were also inferred through the analysis of online digital traces and content similarities. 
Weapons trafﬁcking is mainly concentrated on two major cryptomarkets. Besides, it accounts for a very small proportion of the illicit 
trafﬁcking on cryptomarkets compared to the illicit drugs trafﬁcking. Among all weapon related listings (n = 386), ﬁrearms only account 
for approximately 25% of sales proposal since the proportion of non-lethal and melee weapons is important (around 46%). Based on the 
recorded pseudonyms, a total of 96 vendor proﬁles were highlighted. Some pseudonyms were encountered on several cryptomarkets, 
suggesting that some vendors may manage accounts on different markets. This hypothesis was strengthened by comparing pseudonyms 
to online traces such as PGP keys, images and proﬁles descriptions. Such a method allowed to estimate more accurately the number of 
vendors offering weapons across cryptomarkets. Finally, according to the gathered data, the extent of the weapons trafﬁcking on the 
cryptomarkets appear to be limited compared to other illicit goods. 
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1 Introduction 
Following the major development of the Internet, communication and information technology provided a broad 
range of opportunities to diversify illicit trafﬁcking. Cryptomarkets – marketplaces on the Dark web hosting 
illegal trafﬁcking activities – are among the examples of phenomenon that emerged a few years ago [1]. The ﬁrst 
cryptomarket, Silk Road, was mainly dedicated to the trafﬁcking of illicit drugs [2]. Ever since its closure in 2013, 
many other marketplaces were developed and other illicit goods such as counterfeit products, stolen data, 
counterfeit or falsiﬁed ID documents or ﬁrearms, are also offered for sale [3,4]. The media regularly points out 
the question of ﬁrearms trafﬁcking online [5–8], sometimes implying that it accounts for an important part of online 
illicit trading. However illicit drugs are, by far, the most popular illicit goods proposed on cryptomarkets 
implying that academic research is essentially focused on the trafﬁcking of this products on cryptomarkets (see 
for example [9–13]). Most of the research concerning weapons trafﬁcking is about non-online markets [14,15]. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between weapons trafﬁcking and online trading has been studied, but from very 
speciﬁc perspectives, such as the use of social media in Libya [16]. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, academic 
literature does not provide much information about weapons trafﬁcking on the Dark web. The only scientiﬁc 
study conducted so far was published in a recent report by the RAND Corporation. It addresses questions such 
as the size and scope of market, the revenue generated as well as considering both vendor shops and 
cryptomarkets [17]. The Armory – a market closely related to Silk Road – was opened in 2012 and closed after 
a few months of activity since it was not generating a lot of transactions [2]. Since then, the pieces of information 
related to weapons trafﬁcking on the Dark web mostly originate from online news or discussion websites. For 
example, it seems that the name “The Armory” is still in use, which leads to debates on forums since scam is 
apparently a common practice in the online ﬁrearms trading [18,19]. An interview of a so-called Armory 
administrator is also available [20], but information from such sources needs to be carefully considered. Indeed, 
the sensational media aspect of these sources may raise doubts about their reliability compared to properly 
documented and peer-reviewed academic resources. Despite the limited concrete research about weapons 
trafﬁcking on the Dark web, their availability is regularly exposed, especially since the recent events in Europe 
[21]. The aim of this short communication is to explore the extent and the structure of weapons trafﬁcking on 
the Dark web by drawing an overview of the weapons offered on cryptomarkets in early 2016 through the study 
of data extracted from these websites. 
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2 Methodology 
Through different sources, a list of active cryptomarkets was established in February 2016. These sources include a bulletin 
by the NDARC [22], an independent researcher’s website [23], the HiddenWiki platform [24] listing various .onion resources 
and the website DarkNet Stats [25] providing historical statistics about cryptomarket on the  Dark  web.  Accounts were 
created on 22 marketplaces in order to access their respective listings (i.e. products listed for sale). Among them, 12 included 
a “Weapons” category and, since three of them had no listings in this category, we worked on a selection of nine 
cryptomarkets1. Each selected cryptomarket was accessible via The Onion Router (TOR) and a randomly assigned VPN 
connection was also established before browsing these websites. The entire webpage – along with its pictures – of each 
listing appearing in the selected cryptomarkets’ “Weapons” category was manually duplicated. The same method was used 
to duplicate the proﬁle pages of the vendors offering these listings. Each webpage was consulted to extract the relevant 
information from the listings and proﬁle HTML source codes which constitute the digital traces [26]. For the most important 
cryptomarkets in terms of weapons related listings (i.e. AlphaBay and Dream Market), Python scripts were used to parse the 
listings and proﬁle pages and structure the information. 
Since the listings classiﬁcation was not necessarily consistent between cryptomarkets, every listing was classiﬁed manually 
according to its title — and its description when necessary. The listings were distributed between eight categories: Firearms, 
Ammunition, Non-lethal weapons, Melee weapons, Digital material, Explosives and CBRN, as well as a category Others and 
a category Custom listings including the listings speciﬁcally requested by a buyer (see Table 1 for examples of product in 
each category). Listings not related to weapons – probably misclassiﬁed at the time of its publication by the vendor – were 
excluded from further analyses. Finally, possible relationships between vendors were then investigated, either manually by 
reading the description of the listings and the proﬁle pages, or by using a dedicated software (i.e. IBM i2 Analyst’s Notebook 
8.9.7). When a public PGP key appeared on a vendor’s proﬁle page, it was extracted and imported into a certiﬁcate manager 
to obtain the username and e-mail address given when the key was generated. 
3. Results 
3.1. Overview of the market 
Overall, a total of 425 listings were highlighted. However, 39 of them appeared to be misclassiﬁed since they were not 
belonging to any weapons related category. Table 1 shows the distribution of the 386 remaining listings. 
Considering the 386 listings altogether, ﬁrearms are not the most frequently offered items on the studied cryptomarkets 
(around 25%). Non-lethal weapons and melee weapons also account for an important part of the offered items – around 45% 
altogether 
– despite the fact that they may not be so difﬁcult to obtain in several countries. The term “custom” was included in 63 
listings’ title. For 22 of them, no indication about the offered item could be found in their title, nor in their description – 
hence their classiﬁcation as Custom listings. However, the remaining 41 listings were classiﬁed more precisely. Interestingly, 
39 of them were dedicated to the sale of ﬁrearms suggesting that this kind of items might be frequently traded on-demand. 
Regarding the Digital material category, 15 listings advertised other dedicated websites on the Dark web, among which 
several links were free while others had to be bought. Three sale proposals were dedicated to compilations of 3D printing 
ﬁles designed for weapons. The eight remaining listings concerned various tutorials or manuals about weapons or bomb 
making. 
Only 10 listings included feedbacks of buyers (6 for ﬁrearms, 2 for melee objects, 1 for a non-lethal weapon and 1 for digital 
material). This results contrast with the usual number of feedbacks left after transactions for other products – i.e. illegal 
drugs – which is particularly high for proliﬁc vendors [27,10]. Considering the limited numbers of listings and feedbacks, 
these results suggest that the number of sales is very low. 
Table 2 shows that the population of vendors is composed of 96 proﬁles. Unlike the number of listings, ﬁrearms are the 
category showing the largest number of vendors (35% of the sellers). Both the number of listings and the number of vendors 
indicate that the illicit trafﬁcking of weapons is essentially concentrated on the two main cryptomarkets, AlphaBay and 
Dream market, which concentrate more than 70% of the weapons related listings offered by 69 vendors. 
  
 
 
1 The selected markets are: Aﬂao marketplace (AFL), AlphaBay (ALB), Dr D’s multinlingual market (DDM), Dream market 
(DMA), French Darknet (FRE), The Real Deal (TRD), Oasis (OAS), Outlaw market (OUT), Valhalla (aka Silkkitie) (VAL). 
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Category 
Cryptomarket 
Total Example of items 
ALB DMA VAL FRE DDM AFL OUT TRD OAS 
Non-lethal weapons 47 32 22  8     
28.2%  
(n = 109) 
Pepper sprays, telescopic batons, Taser, 
stun guns, tactical, self-defence pen 
Firearms 66 14 1 5  6 6   25.4%  (n = 98) Semi-automatic pistols, riﬂes 
Melee weapons 35 10 8 3 7    1 16.6%  (n = 64) Knives, blades, shuriken, knuckles 
Digital material 15 10  1 1 2  5  8.8%  (n = 34) URL, tutorials, manuals 
Ammunition 18 5  9      8.3%  (n = 32) 
Large variety of calibers from.22 LR to 
12 Gauge 
Custom listings 1 21        5.7%  (n = 22) 
Listings speciﬁcally created after a 
buyers' request 
Explosives and CBRN 17 3     1   5.4%  (n = 21) 
Firecrackers, ﬂares, military explosives, 
explosives devices, CBRN substances 
Others 2 2 1  1     1.6%  (n = 6) Ballistic vest 
Total 52.1% (n = 201) 
25.1% 
(n = 97) 
8.3% 
(n = 32) 
4.7% 
(n = 18) 
4.4% 
(n = 17) 
2.1% 
(n = 8) 
1.8% 
(n = 7) 
1.3% 
(n = 5) 
<0.5% 
(n = 1) N = 386 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of the weapons related listings. 
 
There are 23 sellers offering weapons on these two crypto- markets. This represents 68% of the weapons dealers on the 
studied cryptomarkets. In general, a seller offers listings only in one category. However, on the two largest cryptomarkets, 
a signiﬁcant number of vendors propose listings in more than one category (i.e. 41% of vendors on AlphaBay and 7% on 
Dream Market). Besides, on these cryptomarkets, respectively 66% and 77% of the vendors manage generally more than 
one listing related to weapons. 
The number of vendors illustrated in Table 2 is based on the pseudonyms of vendors (i.e. vendors with 17 different 
pseudonyms are offering products in the Firearm category on AlphaBay). However, relationships might be highlighted 
between vendors when considering other information extracted from their proﬁles or listings. Such results allow to 
hypothesize that the number of different pseudonyms may not reﬂect the actual structure of the market since sellers may 
actually manage more than one account. 
 
Category 
Cryptomarket 
Total 
ALB DMA VAL FRE DDM AFL OUT TRD OAS 
Firearms 17 5 5 1 3 3 
   
34 
Non-lethal weapons 14 5 
 
3 
  
1 
  
23 
Digital material 9 3 1 
  
2 1 
 
1 17 
Melee weapons 8 3 3 3 
  
1 1 
 
19 
Ammunition 7 2 2 
      
11 
Explosives and 
CBRN 
7 2 
  
1 
    
10 
Others 2 2 
 
1 
  
1 
  
6 
Custom listings 1 4 
       
5 
Total* 49.0% (n=47) 
22.9% 
(n=22) 
11.5% 
(n=11) 
5.2% 
(n=5) 
4.2% 
(n=4) 
3.1% 
(n=3) 
2.1% 
(n=2) 
1.0% 
(n=1) 
1.0% 
(n=1) N = 96 
*The total differs from the sum of each column since a vendor may offer several listings in more than one category. 
 
Table 2. Number of vendors offering weapons related listings by cryptomarket and category. 
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3.2. Relations between vendor proﬁles 
The combination of pseudonyms, PGP key, e-mail addresses and listings’ images as well as proﬁles’ descriptions highlights 
speciﬁc relationship patterns (see Fig. 1). The assumption that the proﬁles sharing the same pseudonym are managed by the 
same person – or group of persons – appears to be conﬁrmed since PGP keys and the proﬁles’ descriptions also match. In 
some cases, images may also strengthen the highlighted connections. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationships detected through the analysis of digital traces. 
Relationships were highlighted between proﬁles sharing the same pseudonym, but also for proﬁles showing very similar 
pseudonyms (e.g. same pseudonyms but different letter case, pseudonyms in the same language or only distinguished by a 
sufﬁx). As the pseudonym is directly related to a seller’s reputation, identical pseudonyms allow to hypothesise a relationship 
between accounts. However, two different entities may also choose an identical pseudonym. Such a hypothesis needs other 
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information to be conﬁrmed. Thus, PGP keys are of particular interest to draw links between vendor proﬁles since they are 
used not only to encrypt communication but also as a “proof of identity” [28]. E-mail addresses are retrieved in the 
descriptions, as well as in the metadata included in the PGP keys (retrieved through a certiﬁcate manager). Combining PGP 
Keys, e-mail addresses included in descriptions, usernames and e-mail addresses extracted from the PGP keys may 
strengthen pre-established links on the basis of the pseudonyms. Several links were also established on the basis of images 
sharing similar framing or features in the background. A large majority of these links correspond to the same proﬁle on a 
cryptomarket. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Number of relations highlighted by type of relation. 
 
Table 3 show the number of links – and the number of linked proﬁles – according to the type of identifying information. 
Most of the relationships connect two vendor proﬁles, mainly through PGP keys and proﬁles descriptions. Links such as 
images or listings’ title tend to conﬁrm the previously established relationships. It is worth noting that several relationships 
were established between proﬁles on the two main cryptomarkets – AlphaBay and Dream market – suggesting that the 
vendors intend to maximize their selling capacities by building a distribution channel on several markets, while taking care 
to keep the same identiﬁers (i.e. pseudonyms, PGP key, proﬁle description) and sometimes the same listings’ images. 
Besides, cryptomarkets are subjected to disruptions (e.g. law enforcement operations, “exit scam”) impacting the number of 
vendors across marketplaces [29]. Maintaining a presence on several cryptomarkets may also prevent a loss of proﬁt when 
a disruption occurs, which has also been observed regarding illicit drug trafﬁcking [10]. 
 
4 General discussion and conclusions 
The results obtained through this study allow to characterise the weapons trafﬁcking on cryptomarkets. Even if the media 
emphasize the question of ﬁrearms selling on the Dark web, the overview drawn through the study of digital traces shows a 
relatively small weapons market compared to the illicit drug market. As described in the RAND report, more listings (n = 
811) were highlighted on the 12 cryptomarkets studied in late 2016. However, this market is still considered as marginal, as 
illustrated by the calculation of the monthly revenue performed with this data [17]. Furthermore, this market appears to be 
concentrated on two cryptomarkets and might be extended to other locations on the Dark web, as suggested by the links 
included in some listings, the dedicated websites highlighted by the RAND report [17] and the interview of The Armory 
administrator [20]. Besides, the analysis of digital traces extracted from active cryptomarkets suggests that this kind of 
market is not well-established compared to the illicit drugs market which is built on the reputation and the trustworthiness 
of vendors, assessed through the feedbacks left by previous buyers [30]. Hence the importance of the low number of 
feedbacks, what induce suspicion from buyers, especially since scam is frequent regrading this kind of trafﬁcking [18,19]. 
Buying a ﬁrearm on a cryptomarket may also be thought as particularly risky because of mail delivery. A weapon is 
inevitably more difﬁcult to conceal than illicit drugs sent in small quantities [13,8]. The online trafﬁcking of ﬁrearms on 
cryptomarket is very limited compared to the extent of the traditional ﬁrearms trafﬁcking which is characterized by large 
quantities of seized ﬁrearms and ammunition (see for example the data of the United Nation Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime 
[15]). Moreover, the large proportion of weapons not necessarily illegal in every country (i.e. non-lethal and melee weapons) 
offered on the cryptomarkets could explain the very few sales highlighted in this study [19]. Indeed, it may not be necessary 
to go through cryptomarkets to buy such items. When considering the relationship between ﬁrearms trafﬁcking and 
communication technologies, the trading through social medias on the Internet – see the recently highlighted example in the 
Libyan context [16] – seems to be way more important than the trafﬁcking on cryptomarkets. 
Among the limitation of this overview, is the fact that ﬁnding some sales proposals online does not necessarily imply that a 
transaction has been completed. Only one of the studied cryptomarkets records the number of sales for a listing, implying 
that the general assessment regarding transactions should rely on feedbacks, which are universal across cryptomarkets. 
Type of relation 
Number of linked profiles 
2 3 4 
Pseudonym 11 2 
 
PGP key 9 2 
 
Description 8 2 
 
Image 6 1 2 
E-mail 2 1 
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Moreover, a listing can be edited (e.g. to change the title, description or categorization) while the number of sales is 
cumulated. Thus, the number of sales is not necessarily related to the item actually offered on the listing. Besides, only a 
few feedbacks were recorded. Using feedbacks to infer that a transaction occurred is a common practice to study the revenue 
of the vendors [31,17]. Indeed, customers are encouraged to leave a feedback after a transaction, it is a way to build trust 
between buyers and vendors and to prevent scams. The practice is well-known among the cryptomarkets community, 
especially regarding illicit drugs. The fact that only a few feedbacks were left about weapons listings suggests that only a 
few transactions for weapons were carried out. Finally, the possibility that these feedbacks are forged cannot be excluded, 
especially when vendors are starting a business. Thus, a valid evaluation of the number of effectively traded weapons is 
hazardous, even if our data allow to hypothesise that the extent of weapons trafﬁcking on cryptomarkets is small. 
On the other hand, the relatively small number of listings and vendors highlighted with this research is an advantage. Indeed, 
it allows a thorough study of the relationships between vendors’. Several digital traces turned out to be very informative to 
conﬁrm linked assumed due to the similarity of vendors’ pseudonyms. The results obtained through this research conﬁrmed 
the potential of combining usernames, emails and PGP keys to highlight distribution channels [28]. Such analysis reveals 
that assessing the number of vendors according to the number of different pseudonyms might be misleading. On the contrary, 
the combination of different information may highlight the precise structure and the main actors of a speciﬁc trafﬁcking 
across cryptomarkets. Using images comparison and a certiﬁcate manager to obtain the username and e-mail associated with 
a key may also provide information to improve the study of the structure. Such a process could be applied to other kind of 
trafﬁcking in order to assess more precisely the number of vendors – or groups of vendors – offering illicit products on 
cryptomarkets. Finally, the results of this study suggest that ﬁrearms trafﬁcking on cryptomarkets is often exaggerated by 
the media [7]. Firearms trafﬁcking on cryptomarkets appears to be marginal, as evidenced by the number of highlighted sale 
proposals, vendors and transactions. 
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